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Abstract 
 
Structuralism covers a broad range of different tendencies in different disciplines over 
the entire twentieth century. The term structuralism is plurivocal: it is used for different 
trends from a variety of different scientific fields and may even diverge on the 
theoretical and methodological levels. This essay examines some of the main trends in 
structuralism not only in linguistics, but beyond in other areas of research on language 
and signs, including philosophy of language through to latest developments in 
semiotics, and most recently biosemiotics. A critical approach to structuralism is 
proposed for the development of critical structuralism involving such problematics as 
Marxian proto-structuralism; the intersemiotic transposition of semiotic approaches to 
linguistic and socio-cultural structures; ontological structuralism and methodological 
structuralism; the human being as a semiotic animal and a structuralist animal.  
 
 
Le structuralisme couvre un large éventail de tendances différentes dans les 
différentes disciplines pendant le XXe siècle. Le terme structuralisme est plurivoque: se 
réfère à des orientations différentes de différents domaines scientifiques, même sur le 
plan théorique et méthodologique. Cet article examine quelques-unes des principales 
tendances du structuralisme, non seulement en linguistique, mais aussi dans d'autres 
domaines de la recherche sur le langage et les signes, y compris la philosophie du 
langage et les développements les plus récents dans la sémiotique et la biosémiotique. 
Ce qui est suggéré est une approche critique du structuralisme, qui vise à développer 
une critique du structuralism portant sur des questions telles que le proto-
structuralisme de Marx, la transposition intersémiotique des approches sémiotiques à 
les structures linguistiques et socio-culturelles, le structuralisme ontologique et 
méthodologique, la rèflexion sur l'être humain comme un animal sémiotique et 
structuraliste. 
 
 
Lo strutturalismo copre una vasta gamma di tendenze diverse nelle diverse discipline 
nell’ambito del XX secolo. Il termine strutturalismo è plurivoco: si riferisce a 
orientamenti diversi di diversi settori scientifici, con divergenze anche sul piano teorico 
e metodologico. Questo saggio prende in esame alcune delle principali tendenze dello 
strutturalismo, non solo nell’ambito della linguistica, ma anche in altri settori della 
ricerca sul linguaggio e sui segni, tra cui la filosofia del linguaggio, fino agli sviluppi più 
recenti della semiotica e della biosemiotica. Ciò che si propone è un approccio critico 
allo strutturalismo, mirando a uno sviluppo della critica strutturalista che coinvolge 
problematiche quali il proto-strutturalismo di Marx, la trasposizione intersemiotica di 
approcci semiotici alle strutture linguistiche e socio-culturali, lo strutturalismo 
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ontologico e quello metodologico, la considerazione dell'essere umano come animale 
semiotico e animale strutturalista. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Worldviews and structuralism 
Approaches to structure and structuralism can be differentiated on 
the basis of worldview, whether explicit or implicit. The focus may either be 
on structures and the world they belong to, or the conditions of possibility of 
the already-made-world with its regional ontologies (Husserl). This is 
necessary for critical analysis and alternative planning. The task recalls 
Husserl’s constitutive phenomenology (1948). Husserl reconstructs 
operations that lead to the constitution of the existing world, thereby 
investigating the human modeling capacity not only in terms of factuality, 
reality and history, but also possibility. Unlike other animals, the human 
animal can construct infinite possible worlds, real or imaginary, concrete or 
fantastic, and not just a single effective world (Sebeok 1991b: 49–58).  
The structure-world relation is conditioned in semiotics by two main 
trends: de-codification and interpretation. Different approaches to structure 
are either connected to code semiotics or interpretation semiotics.  
Code semiotics alludes to a general sign model according to which 
messages are formulated and exchanged on the basis of a code fixed 
antecedently to sign use. The code is based on biunivocal correspondences 
between signifiant (signifier) and signifié (signified) and calls for message 
decodification without the risks of interpretation. In addition to langue/parole, 
signifiant/signifié, other dichotomies involved in the Saussurean sign model 
include diachrony/synchrony, syntagmatic axis/paradigmatic axis.  
The fact of resorting or not to the notion of code distinguishes one 
approach to structure from another. This ambivalent semiotic notion denotes: 
1) a preestablished set of rules for decodification; and 2) meaning-making 
potential.  
In the first case, communication is conceived as information 
transmission from sender to receiver, encoded and decoded on the basis of a 
common code (P. Thibault, “Code”, in Bouissac 1998: 125). The code is 
neutral, immune to interpretation, functional to communication of a message 
conceived as though it were a package transiting from one post-office to 
another. As anticipated, this model is connected to a questionable 
interpretation of Saussure’s (1916) dichotomy between the system of 
language (langue) and individual use (parole) of that system, on one hand, 
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and to first generation research in information theory (Shannon and Weaver 
1949) and cybernetics (Wiener, Ashby), on the other. The latter led to a 
limited interpretation of Saussure’s sign model and its reformulation in terms 
of code/message, emitter/receiver. This explains why the Saussurean model 
thus (mis)understood is connected with code semiotics (Bonfantini 1981; 
Rossi-Landi 1968), being a trend which strongly influenced the development 
of semiotics in the 1960s and 1970s (Petrilli and Ponzio 2007, 2008), 
As meaning-making potential the code allows for given interpretive 
itineraries rather than others, for orientation toward certain types of meaning 
rather than others. The code is understood differently from the first model in 
terms of constitutive traits, grammar, potential value for meaning 
construction. Also, a dichotomous, biunivocal relation is not established with 
behavior. Representatives of this conception include Malinowski (1923), 
Bateson (1951) and Halliday (1984). 
This description of the Saussurean model does not offer an 
adequate account of communication as clearly emerges in the light of 
Peirce’s interpretation semiotics and Bakhtin’s philosophy of language 
(Ponzio 1990: 251–273), and of social-cultural transformations tending 
toward new signifying practices intolerant of polarization between code and 
message. These practices put the hegemony of the code and of the 
centripetal forces of language into crisis with respect to multi-voicedness and 
multi-availability of the sign. Meaning is inseparable from translation in 
interpretive processes; for that matter signs do not exist without another sign 
acting as interpretant (Peirce). 
The trend that highlights structure connected with a code and a 
mechanistic conception of the communication system loses ground with the 
transition from code semiotics (also known as communication semiotics) to 
interpretation semiotics. This transition is connected to Peirce’s semiotics 
which was rediscovered, so to say, during the first half of the 1970s (Eco 
1975). But in Italy, Vailati (a major exponent of Italian pragmatism) was 
already familiar with Peirce thanks to Welby. Transition from code semiotics 
to interpretation semiotics is semiology merging into Peircean semiotics, 
which led Sebeok (1979: 61–83) to talk about “ecumenicalism in semiotics”.  
Eco’s research evidences the code’s role in the development of 
semiotics during the 1970s and Peirce’s influence on transformation. His 
interest in Peirce can be traced to his studies on the triadic relation between 
sign (representamen), interpretant and object; on sign production; the 
inferential processes of abduction; the role of the reader in the text; 
reformulation of the notions of code and dictionary in terms of encyclopedia; 
unlimited semiosis and the limits of interpretation. Eco revisits the question of 
the open work (1962) in terms of unlimited semiosis (1990; Eco et al. 1992), 
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he supersedes so-called Saussurean semiology, critiques ontological 
structuralism (Eco 1968), rejects the binarism of code and message, and 
focuses on the Peircean notions of Dynamical Object and Ground (1997). 
Already in 1976 he made the following statement: “I want to make explicitly 
clear that my present approach has to be labeled Peircist” (quoted from 
Sebeok, “Foreword”, in Capozzi 1997: xiii). 
A code governs information transmission from source to destination. 
But a code only does not guarantee signification. This is because a 
connection cannot be established between 1) a set of signals ruled by 
internal combination restrictions, and 3) a set of possible behavioral 
responses from the destination, without 2) a notion from a set of notions 
about the world which becomes communicative content. Systems 1), 2), and 
3) are s-codes. An S-code is “a system (i) in which all values are established 
on the basis of position and difference, and (ii) which only emerges when 
different phenomena are compared to each other with reference to the same 
system of relations” (Eco 1975: 38). Eco associates the Hjelmslevian and 
structuralist approach with Peirce’s theory of interpretation (see Posner et al. 
1997, 2: 2314; Bouissac 1998: 222). 
 
2. Structure and interpretive process 
Structure is not an a-priori with respect to semiosis, and semiosis 
cannot be reduced to codification and decodification. Structure cannot be 
separated from the process of semiosis, that is, from interpretation (e.g., 
Peirce’s triadic structure of sign, or of argument). 
As Sebeok observes, the Peircean description (CP 5.473) of 
semiosis or sign action conceived as an irreducibly triadic process or relation 
(sign, object, and interpretant) focuses on the interpretant. It concerns “what 
is involved in understanding, or teleonomic (i.e., goal-directed) interpretation 
of the sign” (Sebeok 2001: 17). In other words, for semiosis to obtain there 
must be a purposive action. Signans and signatum or in Saussurean terms 
signifiant and signifié are part of an irreducibly triadic sign structure.  
According to Peirce the term representation was inadequate to 
indicate the general character of the sign. Sign processes should be 
described in terms of mediation (CP 4.3), they presuppose interpretation. 
Rather than represent the object directly to the interpretant, the sign stands 
for the object through mediation by the interpretant. The semiosic function is 
best described in terms of mediation (interpretation) rather than of 
representation. While the formula aliquid stat pro aliquo describes the sign 
relation in dyadic terms, Peirce’s definition evidences the irreducibly triadic 
structure of the sign and places the condition for theorizing the movement of 
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renvoi and deferral that characterizes it. Sebeok emphasizes this aspect of 
Peirce’s analysis of sign structures and relations (1979: viii). 
Not only is a sign a sign of something else, but somebody a Quasi-
interpreter (CP 4.551) assumes something as a sign of something else. 
Peirce analyzes the implications of this description: “It is of the nature of a 
sign, and in particular of a sign which is rendered significant by a character 
which lies in the fact that it will be interpreted as a sign. Of course, nothing is 
a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign” (CP 2.308); “A sign is only a sign in 
actu by virtue of its receiving an interpretation, i.e., by virtue of its determining 
another sign of the same object” (CP 5.569). Semiosis considered from the 
viewpoint of the interpretant, of interpretive sign activity, of inference based 
on signs is described in terms of interpretation. All “signs require at least two 
Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter” (CP 4.551). Activities 
that engender and interpret signs, that is, expression and interpretation, 
describe two faces of the same mental process.  
The Peircean semiotic model is today gaining consensus over 
(Saussurean) semiological structuralism and its correlate mechanistic 
approach to communication (analyzed in terms of codification and 
decodification), extending its influence from philosophy and the language 
sciences to the human sciences generally (Petrilli 2010, 2012). However, this 
does not mean that the mechanistic model has stopped influencing 
communication theory. 
Different conceptions of structure in code and interpretation 
semiotics transcend opposition between binarism and triadism which, in fact, 
is not in itself a criterion of distinction.  
The Saussurean/Hjelmslevian/Greimasian approach to semiotics, on 
one hand, and the Peircean, on the other, are not two factions siding either 
with binarism or with triadism. The problem is not opposition between 
binarism and triadism, but the difference between a sign model that tends 
toward oversimplification with respect to the complexities of semiosis and a 
model like Peirce’s which accounts for different aspects of the same 
processes. The limit of structuralism of Saussurean derivation is not binarism 
in itself, but in the fact that binarism finds expression in the concept of equal 
exchange between signifier and signified, in reduction of complex sign life to 
the dichotomy between code and message, of signhood to signality.  
The interpretant relative to the signal or signality is the identification 
interpretant. In verbal signs the identification interpretant: a) allows for 
recognition of phonemic or graphic contour; b) identifies semantic content 
(immediate interpretant in Peirce’s terminology; meaning vs theme in 
Bakhtin-Voloshinov’s); c) identifies morphological and syntactic configuration. 
The relation of the identification interpretant to the interpreted is univocal and 
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predetermined by a code, as in signals. But the signal component of the 
verbal sign does not characterize it structurally as a sign. A structural 
description of the verbal sign limited to such aspects does not account for its 
specificity as a sign. Like all other signs, except for signals in strictu sensu, 
the verbal sign contains but is not reduced to signality (Petrilli and Ponzio 
2005). 
Therefore, validity of Peircean triadism is not given by triadic form, 
but by its specific contents – categories, sign typologies, dynamics of a sign 
model based on deferral from one interpretant to another. The categories of 
firstness, secondness and thirdness, the triad representamen, object and 
interpretant, characterization of sign on the basis of the triple tendency 
toward symbolicity, indexicality and iconicity all delineate and support a 
conception of semiosis that features otherness and dialogism.  
Peircean logic is dialogic and polylogic. But the merit is not the 
triadic formula. Proof is Hegel’s dialectics where triadism abstracts from the 
constitutive dialogism of life and produces unilinear and monologic dialectics. 
In the entry “Binarism”, Hegelian philosophy is described as a means to 
superseding binary opposition in Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism (see Bouissac 
1998: 81). This is rather bizarre to say the least!  
In his 1970-71 notebooks, Bakhtin describes Hegelian dialectics as 
transforming dialogic relations into abstract concepts, judgements, and 
stances associated with a single and solitary consciousness. The process 
consists in taking out the voices (division of voices) from dialogue, eliminating 
any (personal/emotional) intonations, and transforming live words into 
abstract concepts and judgments. Dialectics is achieved in the form of a 
single abstract and monologic consciousness. Peirce took a stand against 
the constitutive sclerosis of Hegelian dialectics, the expression of the search 
for a conclusion, oriented unilaterally toward a synthesis without the 
possibility of opening to the other and discordance (Bonfantini et al. 2006; 
Ponzio 2004c, 2006).  
 
 
3. Structure and the distinction between genotype and phenotype in 
language analysis. Chomsky, Shaumyan and Rossi-Landi 
Like Saussurean structuralism, the Chomskyian approach is also 
dichotomous (competence/performance, surface/deep structure, innate 
rules/experience). But, once again, the limit of Chomsky’s approach is not 
the choice of binarism. His structuralist theory of generative grammar 
studies rules governing transformation from deep structures to surface 
structures (1965). This distinction and the other between nuclear and non-
nuclear sentences (1957) are connected to a conception of language and 
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knowledge that needs to be questioned, and to an equally questionable 
method of analysis (Ponzio 2004). 
The limits of Chomskyan linguistics emerge clearly in the light of a 
Peircean and Morrisian approach to sign studies. Chomsky sees no 
alternative to vulgar linguistic behaviorism (e.g. Skinner’s), beyond appealing 
to rationalistic philosophy of the XVIIth century and taking sides with 
mentalism and innatism. That the Chomskyan conception of language 
remains tied to the classical alternatives, consciousness/experience, 
rationalism/empiricism has had negative consequences for language theory, 
even in relation to such a specialized branch as syntax (Ponzio 2011, 2012). 
Chomsky’s approach is alien to Kantian critique as much as to 
Husserl, Peirce, Cassirer, Merleau-Ponty, Morris. Unlike Chomsky’s 
dichotomy between linguistic competence and experience, modern 
conceptions after Kant describe experience in terms of interpretive 
operations, abductive inferential processes included. According to this 
approach, experience converges with interpretive operations and, 
consequently, is innovative and qualitatively superior with respect to input. 
After all, experience converges with competence. What Chomsky (1986) 
baptized Plato’s problem (how overall competence derives from limited 
linguistic experience) is a consequence of the false dichotomy between 
competence and experience and ensuing conception of experience as a 
passive state of the subject (Ponzio 1973, new ed. 2006). 
According to Morris syntactics is connected to semantics and 
pragmatics, unlike Chomsky who, like Carnap, separates it from semantics 
and pragmatics. Chomsky speaks of syntax which he distinguishes from 
phonology beyond semantics. In truth, in linguistics (see “Syntactics” in 
Posner et al. 1997–2004, 1: 14–82) and in accord with Morris’s description of 
the three branches of semiotics (syntactics, semantics and pragmatics), 
phonology and syntax (in strictu sensu) of natural language must all be 
considered as part of syntactics. 
Posner distinguishes among three aspects of syntactics present in 
Morris (1971: 13–31): syntactics1 which covers the formal aspects of signs; 
syntactics2, relations of signs; syntactics3, how signs combine to form 
complex signs (Posner et al. 1997–2004, 1: 14). A branch of syntactics3 
which studies combination rules for complex signs is the study of combination 
rules in a sign system called “string code”. An example of syntactics3 is 
Chomsky’s transformation rules from deep structures to surface structures. 
But Chomsky confuses levels of analysis. He mistakes the level of 
description of the objects of analysis for the level of construction of the 
models of analysis. Unlike Rossi-Landi’s (1961) methodics of common 
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speech or Shaumyan’s (1965) bigradual theory of generative grammar, 
Chomsky’s generative structuralism is a unigradual structural theory. In other 
words, Chomsky fails to distinguish between the genotypical (ideal) level and 
the phenotypical (empirical) level of structures. His error is no different from 
that of Oxonian analytical philosophy. Representatives of analytical 
philosophy claim to describe ordinary, daily, or colloquial language in general. 
In reality, they describe the characteristics of a given natural language, 
English. Confusion between two levels of language, the general and abstract, 
on one hand, and the concrete level of a given language at a certain moment 
in historical development, on the other, is recurrent –  and not only in 
Oxonian philosophy or in more recent language analyses inspired by it.  
Chomskyan generative grammar also mistakes the specific 
characteristics of a specific language – again English – for the universal 
structures of human language. Untranslatability of sentences used to 
exemplify his analyses is symptomatic. The structuralist transformational 
model proposed by Chomsky confuses elements that in reality belong to two 
different degrees of abstraction: ideal language and natural language.  
Chomskyan theory of linguistic structure denies the interpretive 
character of the syntactic component of linguistic competence, limiting 
interpretation to the semantic components. Chomsky separates generation 
(which concerns relations between deep structures and surface structures) 
from interpretation. He privileges syntax which he considers as an unfounded 
fundamental, an a-priori conceived in terms of innatism, exempting it from 
interpretation and from the dialogic relation between interpreted and 
interpretant (Ponzio 2004a: 42–44). Chomskyan grammar with its 
methodologic suppositions and dualism between competence and 
experience, deep structures and surface structures, does not exemplify 
syntactics3 as understood by Posner or Morris.  
Ponzio proposes a structural interpretive linguistic theory that 
generates (in Chomsky’s sense) an utterance in relation to another utterance 
that interprets it, that acts as its interpretant. All utterances are engendered, 
that is, produced, identified and characterized by interpretants.  
The interpretant of a sentence (the dead cell of a linguistic system) 
or utterance (the live cell of discourse) is not a deep structure grounded in 
underlying elementary sequences, but another verbal sign. An interpretant 
identifying an utterance or any verbal sign whatever is unexpressed until the 
conditions are realized for its explication. The identification interpretant 
identifies the verbal sign’s: a) phonemic or graphic configuration; b) semantic 
content; and c) morphological and syntactic features. 
The three structural dimensions of semiosis (syntactical, semantical, 
pragmatical) cannot be separated. This means that the interpretant 
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engendered by an utterance is not only an identification interpretant, but also 
an answering comprehension interpretant. The latter is focused on the 
pragmatical dimension of signs, without which it is difficult (if not impossible) 
to even just recognize the sign at the levels described. Just as syntactics is 
present in all aspects of signs (Morris), meaning (i.e., the relation between 
interpreted and interpretant) is also present at the level of identification of the 
units composing words, phrases, utterances and texts. 
As anticipated, a fundamental limit evidenced by Shaumyan in 
Chomsky’s transformational model is that it confuses elements which in fact 
belong to two different degrees of abstraction, ideal and natural language: 
Chomsky’s model cannot be applied to a natural language different from that 
elected for his description, English. This led Shaumyan to contrast his own 
bigradual theory of generative grammar to Chomsky’s unigradual theory: 
differently from Chomsky, Shaumyan distinguishes between two levels of 
abstraction, genotypic language and phenotypic language. 
With his pioneering book of 1961, Significato, comunicazione e 
parlare commune (which anticipates Shaumyan’s book of 1965 on dynamical 
linguistics), Rossi-Land too proposes a bigradual theory of language. He 
introduces the concept of common speech for operations carried out through 
speech and essential to successful communication independently from 
complications arising in concrete reality. The assumption subtending this 
concept is that beyond all historical and geographical differences, there exist 
basic similarities in the biological and social structure of all human 
communities.  
Common speech explains linguistic difference, variety and 
multiplicity in terms of the variety in expedients, solutions, and resources that 
characterize each single language and that serve to satisfy the social needs 
of expression and communication common to all languages. No doubt, 
nothing is ever complete and definitive given that language is in continuous 
development and transformation. By contrast with trends that conduct the 
multiplicity of languages to an Ursprache or to the universal linguistic 
structures of Logos, or to a common biological structure, the notion of 
common speech does not neglect or underestimate what Steiner (1975) 
indicated as “the enigma of Babel”, that is, diversity and multiplicity among 
languages. Rossi-Landi’s common speech does not imply mythical unity at 
the origin of all languages, even less unity of the human species by natural 
law. Common speech proposes a model: it refers to real processes but is a 
theoretical construction and not a immediate description of real processes.  
Unlike the concept of ordinary language developed by analytical 
philosophers and the notions of competence and generative grammar 
proposed by Chomsky, common speech has an interpretive function that can 
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be applied to different languages. Common speech proposes a general 
model to explain linguistic usage and not just describe it and as such is 
applicable to all languages. Linguistic usage is not subtended by something 
mentalistic or ontologically pre-existent to natural languages: Rossi-Landi’s 
model is an interpretive hypothesis which aims to explain real linguistic 
phenomena.  In other words, Rossi-Landi explains the structural features of 
concrete linguistic usage in a given natural language (phenotypic level) in 
terms of his common speech hypothesis (genotypic level), whose validity 
increases the more it can be extended to different languages.  
In the foreword to the first edition of Significato, comunicazione e 
parlare commune, Rossi-Landi excludes any claim to a science of sign 
behavior of the biopsychological or sociological orders, nor does he claim to 
compete with glottologist and their analytical and historical work on different 
languages. The common speech hypothesis is not a general theory or 
doctrine of the cognitive speculative order. It aims at offering a structural 
background and explaining language. Nor does a focus on the a-priori in 
language mean to adopt a deductive aprioristic approach. On the contrary, 
Rossi-Landi develops a hypothetical-deductive, that is, abductive method, his 
methodics of common speech. He aims to explain the language-related event 
on the basis of hypotheses concerning the general conditions that make that 
event possible.  
 
4. Structuralism and critique of the social 
From the perspective of philosophy of language, a structuralist 
approach focused on the general conditions that make meaning and 
communication possible is “critical structuralism”. Possible is understood in 
Kant’s sense as referring to the a-priori in language, the conditions that make 
given facts possible, rather than merely describe them. Rossi-Landi’s 
research on structures common to different natural languages which make 
them possible is emblematic. 
 In his description common speech has a methodic function. 
Common speech evidences how language functions, identifying operations 
inevitably involved when we speak. Rossi-Landi’s investigation is inspired by 
Kantian transcendental logic, which he reformulates in relation to the study of 
verbal language. At the same time, common speech theory supersedes Kant 
with its focus on the transcendental character of language, which Kant left 
aside. Rossi-Landi recovers Kant through Cassirer, the Kantian Peirce and 
the British analysts. The a-priori stands in language. Common speech does 
not concern the expressed linguistic results, which would be an 
oversimplification, but rather the internal and hidden structure of language 
(Rossi-Landi 1961: 165).  
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This approach recalls the notion of “innere Sprachform”, which 
Cassirer borrowed from Humboldt, and is connected with language 
conceived as energheia rather than product, as ergon. Rossi-Landi critiques 
Chomsky’s Cartesian linguistics which is not free of the classical alternatives 
consciousness/experience and rationalism/empiricism. Chomsky ignored 
Kantian critique which superseded both abstract rationalism and abstract 
empiricism.  
Peirce’s semiotics is connected to Kantian philosophy and is 
explicitly anti-Cartesian. Peirce proposes a “New list of categories” (CP 
1.545–559), reinterpreting the a-priori and the transcendental in linguistic and 
semiotic terms. He refuses the rationalism/empiricism dichotomy as unfruitful 
and abstract (CP 5.215–263, CP 5.264–317). Rossi-Landi also critiques 
generic opposition of idealism to empiricism and application of the logico-
linguistic approach to the study of signifying structures in historical 
processes. He appreciates Vico’s historicism (1976) which he implements in 
his critique of the Cartesian model. Insofar as it is based on the notions of 
evidence and deduction, the latter cannot be applied to the historical or 
“human” sciences. 
Marx’s “proto-structuralist” analysis of economic relations also 
deserves mention, French Marxist structuralism aside (Althusser, Godelier, 
Sebag). The study of communication is pivotal in his critique of political 
economy. Marx analyzes commodities thematizing the language of 
commodities and the commodity’s arcanum (Capital, I). He critiques the 
fetishistic view of political economy which views the relation among 
commodities as a natural relation among things, rather than as a specific type 
of relation among social individuals. He studies the structure of commodities 
as messages not only at the level of exchange but also of production. A 
commodity is a commodity not when a product is produced and consumed as 
use-value, but when it is produced and consumed as exchange-value, that is, 
as a message. To keep account of such issues means that economics can 
be considered as part of semiotics (Rossi-Landi 1975). No doubt Marx’s 
approach can be described as semiotic (Ponzio 1990: 174–188), or better 
cryptosemiotic.  
The structure of the market responds to the economic structure of 
human relations, which are relations of social production. The Marxian 
approach to structure is exemplary for semiotics. What Marx achieved in his 
analysis of commodities and capital can be achieved in anthroposemiotics: 
identification of the structure of relations among human individuals instead of 
relations among things and individuals reduced to the status of things. The 
semiotic approach allows for appropriate use of the notions of structure and 
superstructure in a Marxist framework. Difficulty in the study of relations 
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between structure and superstructure often derives from failing to consider 
the mediating element in these relations, that is, the totality of sign systems, 
verbal and nonverbal, operative in all human communities. The pieces in the 
game are not two, but three: to the modes of production and ideological 
elaboration of the superstructure must be added sign systems (Rossi-Landi 
1985). From the viewpoint of semiotics, the structures of nonverbal 
communication (e.g. those pertaining to the circulation of commodities) and 
the structures of verbal communication are structures in the circulation of 
messages: different structures in the same communication process: “Man 
communicates with his whole social organization (Rossi-Landi 1968, Eng. 
trans.: 67). 
All cultural phenomena are communicative phenomena based on 
sign structures and systems. Human nonverbal communication is part of a 
whole, which includes verbal communication. A cultural fact is understood as 
a message organized via sign systems. Therefore, a general theory of 
society coincides with general semiotics (Eco 1968). To study one sign 
system is useful to study another, considering that what one studies is 
essentially the same thing, i.e., homological structures. Whether a question of 
verbal or nonverbal messages semiotics addresses the same problems – the 
work that produces them and makes communication possible. 
Lévi-Strauss (1958a) applied the categories of linguistics to the rules 
of matrimony and kinship systems. In other words, he applied categories 
elaborated in the study of verbal communication to the study of nonverbal 
communication, with which he made a truly formidable contribution to cultural 
anthropology.  
Rossi-Landi (1968) experimented the opposite procedure: he 
applied categories elaborated in the study of nonverbal communication sign 
structures, the categories of economics in its classical phase of development 
(with Ricardo and Marx) to verbal language. However, the difference between 
Lévi-Strauss’s approach and Rossi-Landi’s is substantial and is the difference 
between ontologic structuralism (Lévi-Strauss) – criticized by Eco in La 
struttura assente (1968) – and methodologic structuralism (Rossi-Landi). 
Lévi-Strauss’s reasoning is questionable when he applies the 
categories of verbal language to nonverbal communication in the name of 
“recurrent hymns to the esprit humain”, appealing to a universal unconscious 
activity, to universal structures of the esprit humain. He refers to a 
combinatory principle subtending all codes, an elementary mechanism 
grounded in the human mind. Therefore, the universe of social relations, 
myths, and language becomes the stage for a game played behind our 
backs, which does not involve us as responsible agents. On this account 
human individuals do not determine their own relations but are related 
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passively according to universal laws and structures which they obey 
automatically. 
Instead, Rossi-Landi recognizes human beings as the concrete 
subjects of history, the responsible agents of culture and communicative 
systems which led to his thesis of the homology between verbal and 
nonverbal communication. Linguistic and nonlinguistic work are placed on the 
same level (Rossi-Landi 1968, Eng. trans.: 36). A global semiotic approach 
addresses human beings as homo loquens and homo laborans, recognizing 
that they are constructed historically with the production of instruments and 
artefacts, verbal and non-verbal. Methodological structuralism is connected to 
the homological method and formulation of a unitary definition of the human 
being as an animal that speaks and works, two modes of social behavior 
described as homologous.  
The homology between material and linguistic production throws 
new light on the concept of double articulation in language (Martinet 1960). 
Transition from articulation of sentences into words and monemes, to 
articulation of monemes into phonemes evidences the dual orientation of the 
processes of linguistic production (Rossi-Landi 1968, Eng. trans.: 119–121, 
158–158). Speakers carry out linguistic work – phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically – proceeding from sounds that are initially disarticulate to 
articulate words, phrases and sentences of increasing complexity.  
The structural theory of double articulation assumes that language is 
a formal machine, while neglecting experience and the needs of linguistic 
behavior. It also neglects the problem of the generation of meaning and use 
of sentences, limiting itself to a description of their constituent parts. When 
sentences are analyzed or ordered (Martinet) into words and monemes and 
monemes into phonemes, nothing is said about semantic content at the level 
of sentences as opposed to the level of monemes and words, and at the level 
of monemes as opposed to the level of phonemes. Nothing is said about the 
human operations that produce semantic content. The work of analyzing 
sentences into words and monemes, and monemes into phonemes is 
abstract analytical work. However, analysis must not lose sight of the 
concrete social linguistic work which produces these “pieces”, nor of the 
overall machinery they belong to as, instead, the linguists tend to do. Abstract 
analytical work must not be mistaken for the concrete social linguistic work 
which produces languages and which continues when we speak, when we 
use the materials, instruments and models of linguistic capital. 
An interdisciplinary semiotic approach, intersemiotic translation of 
different approaches to social structures in different fields is favored by a 
homological scheme for linguistic production (Rossi-Landi 1968, Eng. trans.: 
118–152). Unlike double articulation theory the latter is potentially 
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interdisciplinary because it is intentionally predisciplinary. To refer to a pre-
categorial level with respect to the categorial already-made-world means to 
question the idea of science as already formed and defined, and to criticize 
scientific specialization when it loses sight of the human needs for which it 
was originally developed. 
 
 
 
5. The semiotic animal is also a structuralist animal 
A scientific approach studies a world that is in constant movement 
and transformation, formulating laws and hypotheses about it. These can be 
formulated on the basis of the constants, states of equilibrium, systematic 
and essential aspects present in the world. Equilibrium or stability (in nature 
and culture) uniquely concerns a system of elements relatively isolated from 
other systems, which exists objectively and constitutes a potential object of 
knowledge. Therefore, to know reality we must understand the laws of its 
dynamics and development as well as the structural laws of relatively isolated 
systems in a state of relative equilibrium. We need to study the structures of 
dynamics and the dynamics of structures. A global understanding of reality 
requires consideration of these two types of complementary law1. To study 
the (genetic, causal) laws of something’s development means to understand 
the (coexistent, morphologic) laws of its structure. Knowledge of structure is 
just as essential as knowledge of the genesis and development of the objects 
under observation.  
This is why knowledge of coexistential, morphologic laws is among 
the most ancient forms of knowledge in human history: it dates backs to 
when human beings learnt to differentiate among plants and animals, when 
they learnt to articulate reality on the basis of the capacity (acquired with 
practice) to recognize the coexistential traits of differentiation. As a semiotic 
animal the human being is also a structuralist animal (Schaff 1974). 
Structuralism is not only a trend among semioticians, but also among human 
individuals in everyday life insofar as they are human. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 In relation to the issues discussed in this paper it is important to signal the 
morphodynamic structuralist tradition featuring René Thom and Jean Petitot. This 
particular trend has made an important contribution to a deeper understanding the role 
of morphologies in the development and dynamics of structures (see, e.g., Thom 1972; 
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Petitot 1985). However, I can only signal these aspects of the topic under discussion in 
the present paper given space limitations, reserving myself for closer examination in 
my ongoing research. 
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